Introduction
The use of option-based compensation (OBC) has dramatically increased among the Danish corporations over the past few years for its usefulness as an instrument to align the interests of managing agents with those of shareholders (see e.g. Jensen and Meckling (1976) , Holmstrom (1982) , Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) ). The increased use of OBC has taken place during a period which has also seen a generally increased focus on the principles of good corporate governance and shareholder value based management.
1 This article describes and interprets the development of OBC among Danish listed companies from 1995 -when executive and employee stock options were virtually unknown in Denmark -to the present.
The extensive use of OBC has caused considerable debate in the news media as well as in the political arena in Denmark as well as in many other countries -most notably the US and the UK. While proponents of OBC have vigorously advocated the benefits of this new form of compensation, critics have been raised over the excessively generous compensation schemes. However, evidence on the extent to which OBC has been used in Denmark remains undocumented. Although one can find a handful of questionnaire-based surveys in business magazines and in reports from consulting firms and investments banks, the information provided is often incomplete, poorly documented, and inaccessible for an international audience. 2 The primary goal of the present article is to document the use of OBC and its development in Denmark.
The facts and data we present will not only serve to complete the picture and form a more solid foundation for a sound debate of the pros and cons of OBC. It will also enable us to analyze many different aspects of OBC for example in relation to valuation and incentive effects.
The valuation of employee stock options is important for a number of reasons. First of all, the issuer (the firm) and the recipient (employee/executive) of this type of compensation have a natural interest in knowing the value of the options. The firm must assess and report the costs associated with the option grant, and the employee will wish to know the cash equivalent of his/her compensation package. In addition, a valuation scheme -a model -is essential for both parties' evaluation of the option value sensitivities which are directly related to the implied incentive effects. The revenue service, auditors, and investors are other parties with an interest in knowing the value of a firm's OBC plan. Finally, at the 1 In March 2001 the Danish government commissioned a report on proposals for recommendations regarding good corporate governance in Denmark. The report was published in December 2001 and is downloadable (partly in English) from www.corporategovernance.dk. 2 Details on these Danish publications are available from the authors. Some earlier results from our data have been published in Danish as well (see Bechmann and Jørgensen (2003) ).
macro level various statistical bureaus will need option values in order to analyze the tendencies in wage development and aggregated salary data.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: In section 2 we briefly discuss Danish disclosure rules, explain the data collection process, and present summary statistics for our data set. We illustrate the development over time in the number of firms using OBC and determine the distribution between plain vanilla call options, warrants and other option types. Furthermore, we document how the use of OBC varies with the type of the issuing firm, and we present statistics regarding the exercise provisions and time to maturity of the issued options. In subsequent sections we turn our attention to the valuation of the option contracts. The Black-Scholes model (Black and Scholes (1973) ) is adapted for valuation in section 3, and in section 4 we present a variety of results and summary statistics from implementing this model using input variables from our data set. We report the development in total option value over time and present results on absolute values of option programs as well as values relative to the market capitalization of the individual firms. We also describe how the issued options are distributed among various groups of employees, and we compare the development in OBC to the development in traditional salaries during the period in question. Section 5 briefly discusses the provision of incentives via OBC and reports results on key characteristics such as option deltas and moneyness for the contracts in our data set.
The final section concludes.
Disclosure Rules, Data Collection, and Descriptive Results
The basis of this article is a newly collected data set comprised of the complete publicly available information on option-based compensation in all of the 200-250 listed companies in Denmark. This data set was constructed via an analysis of financial statements, annual reports, and company announcements involving information on option-based compensation from the time of issue of the first OBC contract by a listed firm in Denmark in 1995 until July 2003. Details on OBC are available from these sources as a consequence of Danish legislation and the Rules Governing Securities Listing on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange (the Rules). Specifically, according to the Danish Securities Trading Act (Clause 27, section 1), listed firms are required to "immediately disclose important information concerning the firm which may be considered relevant for pricing its stock". The Rules are periodically updated, and in the two most recent issues it has been emphasized that decisions and details regarding option compensation are to be considered as such "important information". The first specification stating that option details had to be reported came in the previous issue of the Rules which was effective as of October 1, 1999. This version of the Rules explicitly required firms to disclose information on option type (e.g. warrant or option), number of options and their date of issue, time to maturity, strike price, and exercise provisions. Firms were also required to disclose information on the distribution of the options among three recipient groups (directors, executives, and employees). In the most recent issue of the Rules, which was effective as of January 1, 2002, the disclosure requirements were further clarified and expanded. For instance firms must now distinguish between managers and other employees in their reporting on recipient groups. In addition firms should report their own assessment of the value of the total option liability. 3 Disclosures should take the form of an immediate company announcement and should be repeated in the annual report.
In order to build a database with all this information we have searched the CSE's electronic StockWise database containing all company announcements dating back to 1995. 4 Annual reports containing the financial statements and associated notes were obtained directly from the listed companies.
In the present section we provide some main descriptive statistics regarding the data set which we have compiled from the above-mentioned sources. We emphasize that the data set contains all publicly available information regarding the OBC plans of all CSE-listed companies. We shall return to discussing some firms failure to disclose information in accordance with the Rules.
First we will consider the development over time in the total number as well as in various proportions of listed firms which have implemented some type of option compensation. The year 1995 is the first for which we have registered an option grant to executives and/or employees in a Danish listed firm. 2) The 100 largest firms measured by total market value of outstanding stocks at the end of the year.
3 The data set contains examples of OBC plans in all types of firms. As seen in There may be several reasons why relatively few firms in the financial sector use options. One possible explanation is the presence of the Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) which monitors a wide selection of variables including directors' and executives' salaries. One could imagine that a general aversion towards drawing too much attention from the FSA might cause some reservation from using this type of compensation. Another possible explanation is that owners find it less relevant to encourage management in the financial sector firms to accept a suitably high risk as firms in this sector are already highly levered as it is. On the other hand the widespread use of OBC in the IT and telecom sectors is not surprising.
Many of these firms are notoriously cash-constrained and perhaps also particularly vulnerable to key employees leaving the firm. Option compensation may be a way to alleviate such problems. Some would also argue that typical employees in such firms are risk-taking talented individuals who have a higher than average taste for at least partial compensation in the form of options.
There are several different ways of issuing option-based compensation. The possibilities vary from regular or plain vanilla call options and warrants over convertible bonds to more specialized constructions involving phantom stock and very complex incentive schemes and option constructions. 7 The common characteristic of all these instruments is that they imply an economic reward to the holder when the price of the firm's stock increases. They will therefore imply an incentive for the recipient to concentrate his efforts to the benefit of the firm's profitability. In this way the incentives of stock holders and option recipients should be better aligned. The difference between the two most common OBC instrumentsoptions and warrants -is that new shares are issued when warrants are exercised whereas existing shares must be delivered following the exercise of options. Warrants may thus be advantageous for cash/liquidity constrained firms but the benefit comes with the cost of changing the firms capital structure and a dilution effect which may or may not be significant depending on the ratio of optionable shares to old/existing shares. Other differences in the design of OBC stem from attempts to fine tune the incentives created. However, a detailed analysis of the more exotic constructions is beyond the scope of this article. 
Call options 54%
Warrants 27%
Other (e.g. phantom stock options, convertible bonds) 8%
Call options and warrants 11%
As seen in Figure 1 , 54% of the programs are regular call options, which thus constitute the most frequently used instrument in option compensation. Pure warrant programs are seen in 27% of the cases whereas 11% of the programs combine call options and warrants. Finally, 8% of the programs use other instruments such as phantom stock or convertible bonds. The relative importance of these other instruments has declined over the past few years and now firms tend to use standard call options or warrants. It has also become more common to mix options and warrants in the incentive schemes. That options are relatively more popular than warrants may be explained by the fact that options can be granted without the approval of the annual shareholders' meeting.
In relation to the categorization in Figure 1 it should be emphasized that although a specific program is characterized as consisting solely of call options it will typically still be rather complex. There are several explanations for this. First, a program often consists of a number of option series with different times to maturity, exercise prices and distributions among executives and other groups of employees in the firm.
Second, one or more exotic features may characterize a specific option series. For instance, the strike price can be increasing over time or defined relative to a certain index. Further, exercise may only be allowed in certain time "windows" or at a series of specific dates. Finally, an option may come with other forms of conditions, stating for example that the recipient must be employed at the time of exercise. In connection with Figure 2 it should be noted that some firms have mixed types of OBC programs, i.e.
they may have issued European-as well as American-style option series. American-style options can be exercised prior to their maturity date whereas European-style options can be exercised only at the maturity date. We have categorized firms according to their most advanced issue with American-style being more advanced than European-style and indexed or increasing exercise price being more advanced than fixed exercise price. deltas. An option's delta is the first derivative of its value with respect to the underlying stock price and is therefore a measure of the strength of the incentive created by the option, cf. also later. The proportion of programs with increasing or indexed exercise price has increased in recent years and is much higher than in the US where virtually all options in corporate incentive schemes are granted with fixed exercise prices (Murphy (1999) ). The development towards options with increasing or indexed exercise prices is probably a reaction to the growing critique of the overly advantageous terms implied by the fixed exercise price construction, see e.g. Rappaport (1999) . Table 3 below presents statistics on the option series' time to maturity at issuance. It is seen that the typical time to maturity for Danish OBC programs is around five years which is considerably shorter than that observed in for example the US. Murphy (1999) reports a typical time to maturity of ten years in US contracts. The fact that OBC programs in Danish firms are relatively short-lived is further documented by the fact that 13 of 94 firms have issued options with a time to maturity of three years or less, whereas only 7 firms have issued options with a time to maturity above 8 years. The difference between Danish and US OBC programs' time to maturity is puzzling at first, but may be at least partly explained by the fact that although Danish firms issue shorter individual option series, they often simultaneously commit to future periodic issues of new options. The implication of such commitments will be a longer effective duration of the incentive schemes than what can be inferred from individual option series' time to maturity. This seemingly "Danish" preference for creating loyalty incentives with revolving option grants instead of longer-term contracts may have been influenced by the court rulings mentioned in footnote 9. 
Option Program Valuation
Following the presentation of some of the main characteristics of our data set in the previous section, we will now turn our attention to the valuation of the programs. The issue of valuation is important to several parties. Not only the issuer (firm) and recipient (employee) have a keen interest in knowing the option value but also outside parties such as revenue services, potential investors, auditors, and salary statisticians.
When valuing option programs one must select a particular model and the results are thus influenced not only by the model choice, but also by the parameter choices and/or parameter estimates used. The literature on option pricing is extensive, and numerous models have been proposed and analyzed. We will not try to present an overview of the many results and recommendations in this literature (see instead Carpenter (1998) , Rubinstein (1995) , and Murphy (1999)), but we will merely emphasize one of the most important conclusions emerging from this literature, which has gained a wide consensus: The value of options issued to employees in a firm depends on whether the option is considered from the issuer's (firm's) perspective or that of the recipient (employee).
If we consider the options from the perspective of the firm, standard option pricing results like the BlackScholes formula (Black and Scholes (1973) ) can be used in a more or less straightforward fashion for determining the value of standard European call options under simple market assumptions. This value of the options is clearly relevant for cost accounting purposes. The firm should be regarded as a free market player and as the firm's financial report should reflect the perspective of the firm and its shareholders and not the entities with which it contracts, the cost of the stock options is the cash foregone by granting the options to employees rather than selling them to external investors. The market value of the options is determined by the cost of hedging the option through dynamic trading of the firm's stock. This hedgebased derivation of the option value is the most fundamental assumption underlying the Black-Scholes formula.
The situation is somewhat different if we consider the stock options from the employee's perspective. As the main purpose of option compensation is to expose the executive's personal wealth to changes in the firm's stock value, the employee is not permitted to sell or hedge his options. 10 With these restrictions, however, the theoretical foundation for the Black-Scholes pricing model erodes and alternative solutions must be sought. The literature on this subject suggests a number of alternative pricing methods. These are typically based on calculations of expected utility and certainty equivalents (see e.g. Lambert, Larcker and Verrecchia (1991) ).
In this article we choose the firm's perspective. In other words, we focus on the firm's cost of the option issue, which appears to be the most interesting quantitative measure in most contexts. Moreover, it follows from the discussion above that taking this perspective justifies the application of standard results from option pricing theory such as the Black-Scholes' formula and its modified versions.
11
The implementation of Black-Scholes formula in relation to a particular firm's option program requires fairly detailed information on the option details and particularly information on changes in the program since its inception. These changes will typically stem from annulment or exercise of previously issued options. Problems with the quality of disclosed information is discussed next.
Data Quality and Disclosure Willingness
The data collection process for this study has not been without obstacles. 12 Despite very clear legislation and recent further clarification of the disclosure requirements of the CSE, some firms fail to provide adequate information on their OBC plans. This constitutes an impediment to our valuation analysis as we will be limited to including only the firms that provide adequate information in order for a valuation to make sense. For the year 2002, for example, 12 of the 94 firms using option compensation must be excluded from further valuation analysis on account of incomplete or inaccurate reporting. In order to illustrate these problems further we have classified the OBC granting firms in three categories according to the quality of the information provided. The categories are labeled "satisfactory", "inadequate", and "vapid". The classification is admittedly somewhat subjective but otherwise rests on the following criteria. The "satisfactory" category represents firms whose disclosure policy follows the Rules of the CSE quite closely, thereby enabling straightforward calculation of the market value of its issued options.
We have assigned the predicate "inadequate" to firms which have released information on contract details which is not satisfactorily accurate to allow for a very precise determination of option value. Lack of precision in details regarding e.g. time to maturity, exercise price, recipient groups and/or date of issue will classify the information as inadequate. A firm's disclosure policy is classified as "vapid" if crucial information like for instance the number of options, strike price or time to maturity is omitted entirely.
When such crucial information is lacking, any kind of valuation will be pure speculation. In the following analyses of option values we have thus not included firms which provide vapid information.
11 In the use of utility-function based valuation methods, it is necessary to include several other agent-specific assumptions such as risk aversion, additional wealth, and general portfolio composition. Option values are often highly sensitive to these assumptions. See e.g. Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991) and Rubinstein (1995) . 12 See also the detailed discussion in Bechmann and Jørgensen (2002) . 13 Three of these seven firms regained the "satisfactory" predicate in 2002. 14 Genmab is an example of a firm with an extensive option program. The description of the program takes up six pages of the annual report and is still not adequate since the distribution of individual option series to executives and other groups of employees in the firm is not documented in the disclosure documents.
Before turning to the presentation of our valuation results, it is important to note that there are a few fairly significant programs which it has not been possible to value. One example is the NASDAQ cross-listed firm Olicom, which has more than 2 million outstanding options but fails to provide information on all options' maturity dates. Another important observation is that the lack of adequate information from a firm in a given year is sometimes remedied by disclosures in later years. In other words, we sometimes find more recent information to be more complete -also with respect to previous years' option issues.
The new information can thus sometimes be used to decipher earlier programs. We are therefore quite confident that the development over time of the option values that we establish provides a fairly accurate overall picture of the development in program values.
Some Notes on the Implementation of the Black-Scholes Model
We have used Black-Scholes' (1973) formula to value the individual option series of the incentive programs. Each firm's option program usually consists of more than one issuance, as new portions are typically issued periodically, e.g. at strike price and time to maturity differing from previously issued series. The detailed assumptions underlying the Black-Scholes formula can be found in any modern textbook on finance theory so they will not be repeated here. The evaluation of the Black-Scholes formula for the value of a call option requires six input variables: The value of the underlying stock, dividend rate, exercise price, time to maturity, interest rate, and volatility. As we are only investigating listed firms, stock prices and historical dividend rates are easily obtainable from various databases. The exercise price and time to maturity are contract characteristics and should ideally be available from company announcements and annual reports, provided that firms comply with disclosure requirements. 15 On each valuation date we use a concurrent five-year government bond yield as "the interest rate". The five-year horizon roughly matches the average maturity of the options, cf. Table 3 . The final parameter is the stock price volatility. This is estimated using daily historical price data spanning one year back from the valuation date. This is a standard procedure which is described for instance by Hull (2003) .
It should also be noted that not all issued options are plain vanilla European call options and thus not in exact correspondence with the derivative asset type priced by the Black-Scholes model. 16 There may be a touch of American option in an option series, or the exercise price may be increasing over time (see Figure 2 ). In some cases we have attempted to adjust the formula according to these specific conditions, 15 Some firms adjust the number of optionable stocks or the exercise price of issued options in connection with dividend payments. In those cases we simply implement the Black-Scholes formula using a dividend rate of zero assuming thus that the dividend protection is "perfect". To the extent that some firms make similar adjustments but do not report this, our calculated option values will underestimate the true value. See Merton (1976) for a series of dividend protection theorems. 16 Warrants are priced using a procedure similar to the one described in Hull (2003) . The procedure builds on the Black-Scholes formula but takes the dilution effect of warrants into account. but other than that we have worked from a pragmatic point of view and judged the highly increased complexity inherent in various extensions of the Black-Scholes formula to be unjustified when compared to the added benefits in terms of valuation precision. This presents a possible source of error in the valuation results presented in the next section, but we regard it as fairly insignificant.
Valuation Results
The current section presents a wide variety of valuation results for the OBC contracts which have been issued by Danish listed firms since 1995 onwards. We start out by presenting It should be emphasized that only a minor part of the increase in the total value of OBC programs up to 2000 is attributable to the fact that the proportion of valuable programs has increased from 17% in 1996 to more than 80% in the new millennium. As early as 1998 the proportion of valuable programs was 72%
and it can be reasonably assumed that the figures from that year onwards quite accurately represent the development in the value of OBC. It is seen that the value of OBC increased about tenfold during the period 1998 to 2000/2001. We conclude that this was partly due to the fact that the number of firms using option-based compensation doubled, but the most important change was in the increase of the average value of the issued programs which nearly quintupled from DKK 10m in 1998 So far we have mainly focused on the absolute value of the OBC programs. However, in an evaluation of the economic significance of the various OBC programs it would be appropriate to compare the calculated option value to the total underlying stock value in order to gauge relative importance. Some key figures from such analyses are provided in Table 5 , which shows the development over time in a number of ratios regarding the relative value of the individual option programs. Table 5 shows that when option value is calculated relatively to the market value of the total share capital at firm level, a significant increase occurred up to a peak at the end of 2000. Option overhang is another measure often used to assess the use of OBC. A firm's option overhang is defined as the number of issued options relative to the number of shares outstanding and can thus be interpreted as a measure of potential dilution. Some key figures on option overhang are provided in Table   6 . From Table 6 it is seen that average option overhang has increased from 1. Table 6 also reveals that option overhang in extreme cases is around 20%. In 2002 the record holder is the above-mentioned medical firm, Genmab.
An alternative perspective on the development in the use of option-based compensation may be obtained by considering the year-by-year development in the total value of new issuances. These values have been calculated and a summary is presented in Table 7 1998  30  307  10  3  72  1999  34  825  24  9  183  2000  57  2,072  36  11  331  2001  54  819  16  3  106  2002  53  715  14  4  80 So far we have considered the valuation of OBC programs at an aggregated level or at firm level. In the following we will analyze OBC grants at the personnel level. Since firms must disclose information on the precise distribution of the OBC on the four personnel groups directors, executives, managers, and other employees we should be able to analyze how the options and their values are distributed among these groups. Unfortunately, the information provided in this respect is often insufficient. One typical problem is that the groups are mixed or that some other classification criteria have been applied instead.
In particular, the distribution between managers and other employees is often unclear and details are often omitted from disclosure documents.
In the following analysis we have therefore chosen to distinguish only between directors, executives and employees (managers and other employees). Moreover, the analysis will only include firms providing usable information on the OBC distribution among personnel groups. For the year 2002 for example this means that our basic sample of 94 OBC granting firms is reduced to 79 firms. However, these 79 firms represent 99% of the total OBC value, so we find it reasonable to assume that it is possible to assess a general pattern in the distribution based on the remaining data set. Table 8 shows the development in the number of firms disclosing information on the distribution of options to the three recipient groups, and it also shows the extent to which firms provide each of the three groups with compensation in the form of options. Table 8 shows that executives are always included in the OBC programs. This is completely as expected since executives presumably have the largest possibility of affecting the company's stock price via their strategic decisions. The table also shows that more than 80% of the programs now include the 'employee'
group. This indicates that OBC is not only used to control and focus executive decisions, but also as a means of strengthening employees' incentive to stay with the firm. In any case the result underlines and partly explains the fact that OBC has been gaining the attention of a wider audience. Perhaps the most interesting finding is the increase in the number and proportion of firms which have included directors in their OBC programs. In about one third of the firms, directors are included in the OBC plans.
Interestingly, this contrasts the recommendations in the highly debated government commissioned report on good corporate governance in Denmark, cf. also footnote 1. Table 9 below is similar to Table 8 except that it shows the development in the distribution of OBC value captured by the individual employee groups. Table 9 shows that over the last four years the executives' share of the total value of outstanding options has been around 25%, whereas employees now hold almost 75% of the options in terms of market value.
It can be seen that directors are also beginning to take their share of option value. Directors' share of option value increased from 0% to 7% from the mid 1990s to 2001. A share of 7% of option value seems quite large in light of the modest size of the group of directors in a firm and the increasing practice to include the directors in the group of option recipients has also been widely criticized. The fact that directors cut decreased to 4% in 2002 is likely a reaction to this criticism.
We conclude the analysis by presenting a couple of tables which compare the development in traditional fixed salary to the value of the total compensation package including options. We focus solely on compensation of directors and executives. The number of employees comprised by these groups as well as their total salaries are typically found in annual reports. Using this information we can calculate salary per director and per executive, both excluding and including OBC. This methodology is the only feasible way of approximating individual salaries as more detailed disclosures on individuals are neither available nor required. The main conclusion to be drawn from Tables 10 and 11 is that regardless of whether we observe medians or average figures, the introduction of OBC has not led to a substitution of the traditional fixed salary.
Stock options have become a supplement -an extraordinary salary increase. Looking for instance at the median figures regarding the development in compensation to executives in Table 10 , we observe that there has been a steady but relatively moderate growth in traditional fixed salary. On top of this, option grants have represented pay rises which totaled a modest 2.6% in 1998, but have later increased to two-digit percentage figures. A similar development is seen in the median option compensation to directors, but note that when the likely politically motivated modesty with OBC grants to directors took effect during 2002 it led to an unusually large increase in directors' fixed salary. If we observe the average compensation data in Table 11 instead, the benefits represented by options are even more noticeable.
Looking at the figures for 2000, we observe that OBC was by far the largest single element of total compensation for both directors and executives. Murphy (1999) has reported similar findings for the US.
Incentive Effects
Quantification of the incentives created by OBC contracts is generally very difficult. Most studies of this issue have looked at the sensitivity of option recipients' wealth to changes in key model inputs such as the underlying stock value and asset volatility, see e.g. Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Hall and Liebmann (1998) . In the following we concentrate on reporting and discussing deltas and the closely related moneyness for the options in our data set. Delta is the first derivative of the option value with respect to the underlying stock price and it can thus be interpreted as the option holder's (dollar) gain per option from a unit increase in the underlying stock price. The incentive to increase the stock price is therefore stronger the higher the delta. The deltas reported are derived from our Black-Scholes valuation of the OBC contracts. 18 Moneyness is calculated as the ratio between the market price of the stock and the option's exercise price and is thus a measure of the extent to which the option is in-the-money.
We first provide Table 12 which reports on the options' moneyness and delta at issuance. With median and average moneyness equal to one and slightly above one respectively, the table shows that options are most commonly issued at-the-money. This is again similar to Murphy's (1999) findings for the US. The preference for at-the-money options in the US is largely explained by their relatively favorable treatment in cost accounting. There is no similar favorable treatment of at-the-money options in Denmark. The
Danish option design may simply be inspired by/copied from the US market. Another plausible explanation for the popularity of at-the-money option grants is offered by Hall and Murphy (2000) who
show that pay-to-performance incentives for risk-averse, undiversified executives are typically maximized by setting exercise prices at (or near) the grant-date market price. As seen from the minimum and maximum moneyness reported in Table 12 there are examples, however, of option programs being issued both out-of-the-money and very deep in-the-money. Similarly, the deltas vary between 0.5 and the maximum theoretical value of one, with typical sensitivities of around 0.75. Options that are issued deep-18 The Black-Scholes approach is not ideal when taking the view of the OBC recipient which is the logical and correct view when trying to measure the incentives created. This should be kept in mind when interpreting the results in this section. However, the alternative utility-based approach requires additional and very restrictive assumptions and the uncertainties surrounding OBC value sensitivities derived from this approach are unlikely to be smaller than the uncertainties surrounding our simpler approach.
in-the-money make little sense as an incentive instrument and suggest the presence of an underlying rentextraction motive. The motive for issuing out-of-the-money or premium priced options may be an attempt to fine tune incentives by making sure that managers are not rewarded until the company's stock price has increased to an acceptable benchmark level. Table 13 shows the evolution over time in average, median, minimum, and maximum moneyness for the entire sample of outstanding OBC programs. During the period 1998-2000, median moneyness was around one. These numbers are influenced by the facts that during this period each year set a new record in new program issues (see also Table 7 ) and that these new options were typically granted at-the-money. Table 14 constitute similar evidence.
When comparing the deltas of Tables 12 and 14 it is seen that this contract characteristic can fluctuate significantly as a consequence of movements in the underlying stock value. These deviations occur despite periodic and significant new at-the-money grants. The incentives provided by an entire compensation package is thus quite sensitive to the vagaries of the market and may therefore be difficult to control accurately. 
Conclusion
This article has documented that since 1996 there has been a considerable increase in the proportion of Managerial rent seeking (see e.g. Bebchuk, Fried and Walker (2002) ) may be another determinant, but testing the causes for and effects of the increased use of OBC in Denmark has been outside the scope of this article. It is obviously an interesting subject for future research.
We have found that the most common type of contract applied in OBC is a standard call option which is the basic element in about 54% of all programs. Warrants are used in 27% of all schemes. The remaining programs combine warrants, options and several other financial instruments. However, the complexities of the programs vary a great deal. On one hand we have fairly transparent programs of standard construction of plain vanilla options or warrants. On the other hand there are quite a few less transparent programs which in some cases include rather complicated constructions and conditions for the instruments applied.
In all cases the option programs issued include executives as recipients. In addition options are issued to the "employee" group in about 85% of all cases. This group includes managers and other employees. The article has also documented how the value of newly issued employee stock options peaked in 2000 with more than DKK 2bn distributed to employees in 57 firms. The newly issued options have generally not replaced traditional salary. Options represent significant extraordinary salary increases on which disclosed information is often highly insufficient. In other words, there is a need for improvement of the amount and quality of information on option compensation in today's market. At present less than 40% of listed firms fully meet the disclosure requirements outlined in the Rules of the Copenhagen Stock
Exchange.
The results presented in this paper provide the first insight into the application of option-based compensation in Denmark. We hope that this insight, combined with further analyses of the data at hand as well as new information, can help to reveal to which degree option compensation has the desired effect -i.e. whether it motivates employees to make an extra effort which in the end will be measurable in the stock prices for the firms.
